

Towards High-Interaction Virtual ICS Honeypots-in-a-Box



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Problem Statement: ICS Honeypots

 Honeypot as defense mechanims: intended to be probed and compromised by attackers.

- No available realistic (ICS) honeypots:
 - Requires physical process simulation
 Requires industrial traffic emulation

 - Requires industrial devices simulation

Our ICS Honeypot:

- Integrated simulation of process and control
- High-interaction, Virtual, Low cost
- Deterministic execution in real-time
- Runst in-a-Box, SDN compatible, Reconfigurable

Attackei Internet VPN/Gateway L1 Network Process 1 Process n Process 2

Our ICS Honeypot Architecture:

- Vulnerable internet-facing interfaces: VPN, SSH, and Telnet.
- Network emulation: topology, protocol, link shaping.
- Simulated devices: PLC logic, web servers.
- Physical process simulation: water treatment, water distribution.
- Physical and network layer API: interfaces between devices, network and physical process.

High-Interaction virtual honeypot Simulated PLC VPN **Physical** Device Process **Emulated** SSH |Simulation| network <u>Telnet</u> ← Gateway Simulated HMI Internet Real ICS/SCADA system PLC Attacker VPN Device ICS **Physical Process** network SSH Telnet Gateway HMI

Our ICS Honeypot SWaT Implementation:





Table 2: Honeypot metrics evaluation summary.

Metric	By design Implemented
Network	
IP, MAC and netmask	•
Packet loss	•
Packet delay	•
Bandwidth	•
Topology	•
Common protocols	•
Industrial protocol	• •
Advanced Traffic	• •
Physical	
Realistic math model	•
Sensor readings	•
Actuators driving	• •
Control logic	•
Human operations	• •
Advanced Process	• •
Legend ●: full suppo	ort, • partial support.

Our ICS Honeypot S3 CTF Evaluationtation:

- S3 jeopardy-style Capture-the-Flag (CTF)
- Six m3-type AWS EC2, one OS per honeypot
- Idraulic simulation of water treatment (SWaT) process 1
- Simulated four PLCs, an HMI and two water tanks
- Star topology, EtherNet/IP, vulnerable SSH
- Scoring flask webapp using Let's Encrypt (HTTPS)

Table 1: CTF Results Summary



#: Number Of, LOC: Lines Of Code

*{1: ettercap, 2: nmap, 3: netstat, 4: tcpdump, 5: tshark 6: ifconfig, 7: cpppo, 8: ping}