



# CTRAPS: CTAP Client Impersonation and API Confusion on FIDO2

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# FIDO2 Entities and CTAP and WebAuthn Protocols



# CTRAPS Motivation

- FIDO2 trusted by billions of accounts daily
  - CTAP attacks have critical S&P impact (delete creds, track, ...)
  - Regardless of transport (USB, NFC, BLE) and target (Cli, Auth)
- Limited prior work on CTAP
  - Formal verif and theoretical eve, spoof, MitM attacks on CTAPv2.0 [Barbosa21,Guan22]
  - Practical MitM on CTAPv2.1 DH [Barbosa23]

# CTRAPS Contributions

- First S&P evaluation of the **CTAP Authenticator API**
  - Uncover **7 design issues** (unauth Client, ...)
  - Affecting **CTAP v2.0, v2.1, and v2.2**
- Two new attack classes resulting in **11 CTRAPS attacks**
  - **Client Impersonation** attacks ( $CI_1, \dots, CI_4$ )
  - Client-Auth **API Confusion** attacks ( $AC_1, \dots, AC_7$ )
  - Eg: Reset Authenticator via NFC with 0-click
- Open source [CTRAPS toolkit](#) (virt testbed, 4 Clients, ...)
- Evaluation **exploiting 16 FIDO2 devices (Auth, Cli, RP)**
- Discuss **8 backward-compliant fixes**

# CTRAPS Authenticator API Attack Surface

CTAP API	SN	UV	UP	Subcmd
MakeCred	MC	Yes	Yes	No
GetAssertion	GA	Yes <sup>1</sup>	Yes <sup>1</sup>	Yes
CredMgmt	CM	Yes	No	Yes
ClientPin	CP	Yes <sup>2</sup>	No	Yes
Reset	Re	No	Yes	No
Selection	Se	No	Yes	No
GetInfo	GI	No	No	No

**UV:** User enters on Client PIN or password

**UP:** User presses a button on Auth or Auth and Client in NFC range


Yes<sup>1</sup> : depends on Client and RP configuration

Yes<sup>2</sup> : depends on the API subcommand.


# CTRAPS Threat Model

Attacker focuses on **design issues on CTAP Auth API**.

CI and AC attackers are **in proximity** (eg: NFC range with Auth) or **remote** (eg: malicious app spoofing Client on User's phone)



# CI<sub>1</sub> Attack: Factory Reset Auth over NFC (**Reset**)




# Four CI Attacks

- **CI<sub>1</sub>**: Factory Reset Authenticator (**Reset**)
- **CI<sub>2</sub>**: Track User from Creds (**GetAssertion**)
- **CI<sub>3</sub>**: Force Authenticator lockout (**ClientPin**)
- **CI<sub>4</sub>**: Profile Authenticator (**GetInfo**)



# AC<sub>2</sub> Attack: Factory Reset Auth (**Reset**)



# CTRAPS Seven AC Attacks

- $AC_1$ : Delete Discoverable Creds (**CredMgmt**)
- $AC_2$ : Factory Reset Authenticator (**Reset**)
- $AC_3$ : Track User from Credentials (**GetAssertion**)
- $AC_4$ : Fill Authenticator Credentials Storage (**MakeCred**)
- $AC_5$ : Force Authenticator Lockout (**ClientPin**)
- $AC_6$ : Authenticator DoS (**Selection**)
- $AC_7$ : Profile Authenticator (**GetInfo**)

# CTRAPS Exploit 6 Authenticators

Authenticator	CI <sub>1</sub>	CI <sub>2</sub>	CI <sub>3</sub>	CI <sub>4</sub>	AC <sub>1</sub>	AC <sub>2</sub>	AC <sub>3</sub>	AC <sub>4</sub>	AC <sub>5</sub>	AC <sub>6</sub>	AC <sub>7</sub>
YubiKey 5	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	n/a	✓
YubiKey 5 FIPS	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	n/a	✓
Feitian K9	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	n/a	✓
Solo V1	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	n/a	✓
Solo V2 Hacker	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
OpenSK	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Auths vulnerable to all CI attacks

Auths vulnerable to all AC attacks

n/a: not applicable as Auth does not implement Selection

# CTRAPS Exploit 10 Relying Parties (RPs)

Rp	RpId	Cred	Delete Creds	Track User	DoS Authenticator
Adobe	adobe.com	Disc	CI <sub>1</sub> , AC <sub>1</sub> , AC <sub>2</sub>	CI <sub>2</sub> , AC <sub>3</sub>	CI <sub>3</sub> , AC <sub>4</sub> , AC <sub>5</sub> , AC <sub>6</sub>
Apple	apple.com	DiscWeak	CI <sub>1</sub> , AC <sub>1</sub> , AC <sub>2</sub>	CI <sub>2</sub> , AC <sub>3</sub>	CI <sub>3</sub> , AC <sub>4</sub> , AC <sub>5</sub> , AC <sub>6</sub>
DocuSign	account.docusign.com	NonDisc	CI <sub>1</sub> , AC <sub>2</sub>	n/a	CI <sub>3</sub> , AC <sub>5</sub> , AC <sub>6</sub>
Facebook	facebook.com	NonDisc	CI <sub>1</sub> , AC <sub>2</sub>	n/a	CI <sub>3</sub> , AC <sub>5</sub> , AC <sub>6</sub>
GitHub	github.com	Disc	CI <sub>1</sub> , AC <sub>1</sub> , AC <sub>2</sub>	CI <sub>2</sub> , AC <sub>3</sub>	CI <sub>3</sub> , AC <sub>4</sub> , AC <sub>5</sub> , AC <sub>6</sub>
Hancock	hancock.ink	Disc	CI <sub>1</sub> , AC <sub>1</sub> , AC <sub>2</sub>	CI <sub>2</sub> , AC <sub>3</sub>	CI <sub>3</sub> , AC <sub>4</sub> , AC <sub>5</sub> , AC <sub>6</sub>
Microsoft	login.microsoft.com	DiscWeak	CI <sub>1</sub> , AC <sub>1</sub> , AC <sub>2</sub>	CI <sub>2</sub> , AC <sub>3</sub>	CI <sub>3</sub> , AC <sub>4</sub> , AC <sub>5</sub> , AC <sub>6</sub>
NVidia	login.nvgs.nvidia.com	Disc	CI <sub>1</sub> , AC <sub>1</sub> , AC <sub>2</sub>	CI <sub>2</sub> , AC <sub>3</sub>	CI <sub>3</sub> , AC <sub>4</sub> , AC <sub>5</sub> , AC <sub>6</sub>
Synology	account.synology.com	Disc	CI <sub>1</sub> , AC <sub>1</sub> , AC <sub>2</sub>	CI <sub>2</sub> , AC <sub>3</sub>	CI <sub>3</sub> , AC <sub>4</sub> , AC <sub>5</sub> , AC <sub>6</sub>
Vault Vision	auth.vaultvision.com	Disc	CI <sub>1</sub> , AC <sub>1</sub> , AC <sub>2</sub>	CI <sub>2</sub> , AC <sub>3</sub>	CI <sub>3</sub> , AC <sub>4</sub> , AC <sub>5</sub> , AC <sub>6</sub>

DiscWeak: discoverable and unprotected

Cannot login and lost creds, Account trackable, Cannot login

n/a: not applicable because RP does not support Disc Creds