# CheckOCPP: Automatic OCPP Packet Dissection and Compliance Check

Soumaya Boussaha, ACSW'25, 30th June 2025

**Authors** 



Soumaya Boussaha Vict SAP, EURECOM EU Biot, France soumaya.boussaha@sap.com vict

Victor Fresno Gómez EURECOM, UPM Madrid, Spain victorfresno@live.com


Thomas Barber SAP Baden-Wurtemberg, Germany thomas.barber@sap.com Daniele Antonioli EURECOM Biot, France daniele.antonioli@eurecom.fr














#### AUTHORIZATION


#### **RESERVE NOW**





#### **Raw OCPP**





# Motivation


• Non-compliance -> Can introduce exploitable implementations.

Existing tool (OCTT) maintained by OCA is closed-source and behind a paywall ( $\in$ 3,000– $\in$ 18,000).


• Multiple versions and features makes it hard to conduct traffic analysis without proper dissection of OCPP packets.

 $\rightarrow$  Need for an open-source solution to dissect and compliance check OCPP traffic for all versions.

## CheckOCPP : Design



### CheckOCPP : Architecture



# **CheckOCPP : Implementation**

CheckOCPP supports the **76** distinct OCPP **messages** across ver **1.6**, **2.0**, **and 2.0.1**. TABLE 1. CHECKOCPP OCPP MESSAGE COMPATIBILITY


Message	Version	
Heartbeat	1.6, 2.0, 2.0.1	
BootNotification	1.6, 2.0, 2.0.1	
Authorize	1.6, 2.0, 2.0.1	
StatusNotification	1.6, 2.0, 2.0.1	
TransactionEvent	2.0, 2.0.1	
Reset	1.6, 2.0, 2.0.1	
MeterValues	1.6, 2.0, 2.0.1	
CancelReservation	1.6, 2.0, 2.0.1	
ReserveNow	1.6, 2.0, 2.0.1	
ClearCache	1.6, 2.0, 2.0.1	
ChangeAvailability	1.6, 2.0, 2.0.1	
ClearChargingProfile	1.6, 2.0, 2.0.1	
DataTransfer	1.6, 2.0, 2.0.1	
SendLocalList	1.6, 2.0, 2.0.1	
SetChargingProfile	16 20 201	

### **Evaluation Setup**



For OCPP 1.6

### **Evaluation Setup**



#### **EmuOCPP: Effective and Scalable OCPP Security and Privacy Testing**

Soumaya Boussaha SAP, EURECOM, Biot, France soumaya.boussaha@sap.com

> Thomas Barber SAP SE, Walldorf, Germany thomas.barber@sap.com

#### Abstract

The Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP) is the de facto standard for communication between electric vehicle charging stations (CS) and charging station management systems (CSMS). However, its security and privacy have been only partially explored, mainly due to the lack of an adequate testing framework. To this end, we introduce EmuOCPP, a new OCPP security and privacy testing framework. The framework is based on container emulation to reproduce real-world OCPP networks with high fidelity and low cost. We discuss our implementation of EmuOCPP, using open-source software (IPMininet) and low-cost hardware.

Using EmulOCPP we uncover five attacks on OCPP 16

Victor Fresno Gómez EURECOM, UPM, Madrid, Spain victorfresno@live.com


Daniele Antonioli EURECOM, Biot, France daniele.antonioli@eurecom.fr

Numerous studies have examined the security and privacy of OCPP, primarily focusing on 1.6 [2, 14, 29, 30, 32, 36, 47]. These works have highlighted critical security concerns, including man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks, denial-of-service (DoS) threats, and protocol implementation weaknesses. Additionally, privacy-related risks such as tracking attacks and data leakage have been explored [2, 22, 49]. In contrast, research on OCPP 2.0 and 2.0.1 remains significantly limited, with only a few studies addressing some security aspects [4, 31].

The limited research on more recent OCPP versions is due to the lack of a comprehensive OCPP security and privacy testing framework. Existing tools are fragmented, restricting researchers from conducting holistic security analysis. For

Boussaha, S., Fresno Gómez, V., Barber, T., & Antonioli, D. (2025). *EmuOCPP: Effective and Scalable OCPP Security and Privacy Testing*. In *VEHICLESEC 2025, 3rd USENIX Symposium on Vehicle Security and Privacy* (co-located with USENIX Security), 11–12 August 2025, Seattle, WA.

## **Evaluation Setup**



For OCPP all versions

### Dissection

lo.	Time	Source	Desl Protocol	Length Info			
	9 11.970862473	fe80::e3a6:46e4:	f OCPP 2.0.1	245 WebSocket	Text	[FIN]	[MASKED]
	10 11.977420839	fe80::e3a6:46e4:	f., OCPP 2.0.1	196 WebSocket	Text	[FIN]	
	11 11.980614818	fe80::e3a6:46e4:	f OCPP 2.0.1	149 WebSocket	Text	[FIN]	[MASKED]
	12 11.983355333	fe80::e3a6:46e4:	f OCPP 2.0.1	135 WebSocket	Text	[FIN]	
	44 22.018151683	fe80::e3a6:46e4:	f., OCPP 2.0.1	135 WebSocket	Text	[FIN]	[MASKED]
	45 22.020017291	fe80::e3a6:46e4:	f OCPP 2.0.1	135 WebSocket	Text	[FIN]	-
	72 30.003827005	fe80::e3a6:46e4:	f OCPP 2.0.1	215 WebSocket	Text	[FIN]	
	74 30.006591730	fe80::e3a6:46e4:	f OCPP 2.0.1	155 WebSocket	Text	[FIN]	[MASKED]
	98 32.022107410	fe80::e3a6:46e4:	f OCPP 2.0.1	136 WebSocket	Text	[FIN]	[MASKED]
Linu Inte Trar	ix cooked capture ernet Protocol Ve	e v1 ersion 6, Src: fe80	::e3a6:46e4:bff	otured (1720 bits) 9:fb8e, Dst: fe80:: rt: 52718, Seq: 541	e3a6:4	16e4 : b1	f9:fb8e
Linu Inte Trar WebS OCPF Me Me	ax cooked capture ernet Protocol Ve ismission Control Socket P Protocol Payloa essage Type: 2 (2 essage ID: "1a23 essage Name: "Res ayload (JSON): Pa	e v1 ersion 6, Src: fe80 l Protocol, Src Por ad 2=Request, 3=Respon dfcc-b844-4372-bb40 serveNow"	::e3a6:46e4:bff9 t: 9005, Dst Por se, 4=Error) -3d9cd7a90a8b"	):fb8e, Dst: fe80::	e3a6:4	16e4 : b1	f9:fb8e

## Compliance

0.	Time	Sou Desti Protocol	Length Info
	120 5.324066	1 19 OCPP 1.6	263 WebSocket Text [FIN] [MASKED]
	121 5.331521	1 19 OCPP 1.6	142 WebSocket Text [FIN]
	123 5.749146	1 19 OCPP 1.6	88 WebSocket Text [FIN] [MASKED]
	124 5.756022	1 19 OCPP 1.6	108 WebSocket Text [FIN]
	126 5.963865	1 19 OCPP 1.6	196 WebSocket Text [FIN] [MASKED]
	127 5.968789	1 19 OCPP 1.6	72 WebSocket Text [FIN]
	129 6.176233	1 19 OCPP 1.6	196 WebSocket Text [FIN] [MASKED]
	130 6.183614	1 19 OCPP 1.6	72 WebSocket Text [FIN]
8	328 14.835795	1 19 OCPP 1.6	302 WebSocket Text [FIN]
	329 15.047999	1 19 OCPP 1.6	316 WebSocket Text [FIN] [MASKED]
	338 15.451605	1 19 OCPP 1.6	88 WebSocket Text [FIN] [MASKED]
	339 15.454168	1 19 OCPP 1.6	108 WebSocket Text [FIN]

Ethernet II, Src: Espressif\_f8:3b:bd (78:21:84:f8:3b:bd), Dst: Intel\_de:a8:ff (f4:c8:8a:de:a8:ff)

```
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.4.1, Dst: 192.168.4.2
```

Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 52772, Dst Port: 9001, Seq: 798, Ack: 667, Len: 262

WebSocket

OCPP Non-Compliant Packet

Error during schema validation: property "unknownKey" validation failed: failed to validate item 1: string too long

CheckOCPP successfully identified **three** noncompliant messages, including an improperly formatted GetConfiguration for the EmonEVSE device

## Summary

- We present CheckOCPP, a novel OCPP toolkit for packet dissection and compliance checks.
- We validated CheckOCPP in an evaluation against Mobility House (OCPP 2.0 & 2.0.1) and EmonEVSE (OCPP 1.6) & EmuOCPP.
- Open-Sourced here : <u>https://github.com/vfg27/CheckOCPP</u>

Soumaya BoussahaVictor Fresno GómezThomas BarberSAP, EURECOMEURECOM, UPMSAPBiot, FranceMadrid, SpainBaden-Wurtemberg, Germanysoumaya.boussaha@sap.comvictorfresno@live.comthomas.barber@sap.com

Daniele Antonioli EURECOM Biot, France daniele.antonioli@eurecom.fr